Rawls

Rawls' rejection of moral desert as the basis of distributive justice.

反對道德應(yīng)得是公正分配的基礎(chǔ)相類似

Rawls illustrates this by considering several rival theories of justice.

羅爾斯通過其他公正理論 來說明這一點

Rawls's idea is that there should only be so much difference that it helps the least well off the most.

羅爾斯的觀點是 分配的差異 應(yīng)該止于讓最不利群體獲利最大化

Rawls actually has two arguments, not one, in favor of his principles of justice.

羅爾斯其實有兩個論點 而非一個 支持他的公正原則

Rawls's claim that these two principles would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.

會被處在無知之幕背后的人們選擇 我想聽一聽你們的看法

Rawls argues, are lead to embrace a system of fair equality of opportunity.

羅爾斯說 會轉(zhuǎn)而支持機會均等的體系

Rawls says, well the thing that's obviously wrong about it is that people's life prospects are determined by the accident of birth.

羅爾斯認(rèn)為 最明顯的問題 在于人的生活前景決定于 出身的偶然性

Rawls says that this represents an improvement over aristocratic and caste systems, because everyone can compete for every job.

羅爾斯認(rèn)為這代表了一種進步 超越了貴族制度和等級制度 因為每個人都能競爭所有的工作

Rawls rejects teleological accounts of justice because he says that teleological theories of justice threaten the equal basic rights of citizens.

羅爾斯反對以目的論角度考慮公正 因為他說 從目的論出發(fā)的公正 威脅了 公民平等的基本權(quán)利

Rawls argued that it's a mistake to think that distributive justice is a matter of moral desert, a matter of rewarding people according to their virtue.

羅爾斯指出 公正分配 并非取決于道德應(yīng)得 即由德行決定回報